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THE FUTURE OF PATENT TROLL LEGISLATION
AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ENERGY INDUSTRY
JOHN DAVID WEIDMAN *

Introduction
Trolls have a proper place in fairy tales as tricksters and monsters. They
live under bridges (that they did not even build) and only let travelers pass
if they answer riddles or surrender a tax of gold coins or other valuables.
The hero in these stories is generally smart enough to answer the troll’s
riddles. But if they are truly courageous, they kill the troll. Killing a troll is
much harder than just paying them, so why even put forth the effort? Thus,
the trolls have a good gig going—minimal cost or risk on their part makes
for the perfect extortion scheme.
Modern language uses the term “troll” to describe many different people
and acts of particular annoyance. Most notably, there are internet trolls:
people with fake profiles who make inflammatory comments on internet
news sites and message boards, invoking strong and entertaining reactions
from legitimate users. Internet trolls are without a doubt the most common
type of troll a person will encounter, but at the end of the day, they do not
cause significant economic damage. Therefore, they are not viewed as a
genuine threat. A more effective and dangerous modern troll—the patent
troll 1—imitates the more traditional meaning of troll: extorting money out

* Special thanks for the direction and encouragement from my faculty advisor, Sarah
Burstein, and my editors: Megan Anson, Douglas Brooking, and Mason Smith.
1. Here, “patent troll” refers to entities engaging in extortion or fraud through threat of
ungrounded patent litigation. The author recognizes that many refer to these entities as NPEs
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of businesses for infringement of patents (their bridge) that their claims
unlikely cover. Instead of charging for passage on a bridge, patent trolls
extort money out of anyone who ventures near the river. The term “patent
troll” is quite inflammatory—painting a picture of a nasty, monstrous
extortionist that many think hyperbolizes the extent of the damage they
actually cause. But with their specific targeting of some major industries—
technology and energy—the economic impact, and the outcry for
lawmakers to act, it is clear they truly have become monsters.
The actions of state legislatures,2 former President of the United States
Barack Obama, 3 and technology and energy leaders have urged for the
creation of federal legislation to prevent the abuse of the patent system at
the hands of patent trolls. Some technology companies have even begun
forming giant patent alliances in hopes of avoiding trolls.4 The complicated
relationship between state and federal legislation in respect to bad faith
patent claims—the only real indicator of dealing with a patent troll—and
the appropriate steps required to address this problem have major effects on
the energy industry. A federal anti-patent-troll law could fix many of the
problems arising out of the multiple standards from state law, but changes
in civil procedure and venue law—such as the recently decided Supreme
Court case TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC—look
promising to be more effective at stopping patent trolls overall but less
effective in the energy industry.
Problems plague every step in the legislative process—from the very
definition of a troll to finding ways to protect against them without
completely gutting patent owner’s rights. Effectively defining “patent troll”
poses the first of many obstacles for lawmakers. As with any statutory
definition, too narrow or broad a definition may lead to significant dangers
for all involved in the patent system. Patent trolls are often referred to as

or PAEs (discussed later) but has chosen not to include those because of several discussed
flaws.
2. Qian Huang, Grace King & Tim Rawson, Navigating the Landscape of AntiTrolling Legislation, INTELL. PROP. MAG. 54, June 2016, available at https://www.pillsbury
law.com/en/news-and-insights/navigating-the-landscape-of-anti-trolling-legislation.html.
3. Anne Flaherty, Congress May Target Patent Trolls Who Prey on Tech Industry
Innovation, PBS NEWSHOUR, (Apr. 14, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/congress-may-target-patent-trolls-prey-tech-industry-innovation/ (President Obama
stated that he supported the bill and patent reform).
4. The Patent Troll Problem, LOTNETWORK (2016), http://lotnet.com/the-patent-trollproblem/.
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NPEs, or non-practicing entities, 5 but that reference misses several
important distinctions of perfectly legal NPEs, including licensing firms
and many universities. The definition of patent troll, the state legislation
and their problems, the lack of federal action, and the possible changes in
venue law through the Supreme Court all factor into the problems of the
modern troll and an economic drain on the energy industry. First, the
comment will address the definition of patent troll and who they are prone
to target. Then, it will examine what states have attempted to curb trolls and
the many problems the state laws encounter. Next, the comment will
consider the options of federal action taken against trolls and the effects of
recent venue reform through the Supreme Court. Last, possible patent troll
weaknesses will be studied through the alternative actions such as private
license agreements designed to quash trolls’ ability to sue certain entities
for infringement.
I. Definition Of A Patent Troll And Its Targets
True patent trolls extort by acting as companies protecting their
rightfully-owned patents when they either do not own the rights to that
claimed property or are asserting those rights against someone they have no
reason to believe infringes. Trolls execute the disguise so well that it is
increasingly difficult to identify the trolls from legitimate businesses—
many trolls view themselves as legitimate businessmen anyway. Trolls try
to monetize whatever patents they have accumulated by claiming (or
threatening to claim) invalid or very weak patent infringements in court
against businesses who are likely to settle or pay a small license fee to
avoid paying the hefty price of patent litigation. 6 In addition to the
economic and temporal costs of fighting patent trolls, there is the risk that a
vague demand letter could turn out to be a legitimate claim, and that by
paying the relatively small fee, the troll promises to disappear under its
bridge, taking that risk with it.7
Technically, patent trolls are a type of NPE.8 Patent licensing firms,
along with universities and research laboratories, are also NPEs, but they
foster innovation by protecting against actual infringement, pushing
5. Matteo Sabattini, NPEs vs. Patent Trolls: How to Build a Healthy Innovation
Ecosystem, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/04/npepatent-trolls-innovation-ecosystem/id=54427/.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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licensing to prevent free riding, and providing revenue through legal means
that can be poured into new investments. 9 Many companies fighting against
patent trolls choose to call them PAEs, or patent assertion entities, but that
name implies that asserting patent rights constitutes a de facto wrong or
illegal action.10 The common use of PAE suggests that a party trying to
assert a patent—except of course the person accusing the PAE of being a
troll—has ill intent. The vast difference in these definitions is one that must
be addressed in an effective piece of legislation. The statutory definition
must clearly distinguish between the helpful licensing and research of
legitimate NPEs, the just actions of asserting patent rights against an
infringer, and harmful entities with an end goal of extortion who merit the
label of troll.
As for the common target of patent trolls, the industry must be one with
a high number of patents and new filings, many large companies likely to
pay settlement demands rather than go to court, and a wide base of smaller
companies to better disguise the troll as a small inventor protecting its
work. In general, the ideal target either has so much money that they would
rather pay the troll out of annoyance or is small enough that it cannot
handle the financial burden or risk of one of its few patents failing in court.
Initially, the main target was the booming technology industry. As that
industry slowly learned to deal with trolls, they have expanded somewhat to
the similarly patent-heavy energy industry.
A. Trolls Started With And Continue Targeting Technology Companies
The technology industry in the United States has seen many successes in
recent years, and with that success came an onslaught of patent litigation
and patent troll claims. 11 Though an older—and now failing 12—giant,
Yahoo legal counsel claimed they spent around $100 million fighting patent
trolls between 2007 and 2015. 13 The reaction of the major technology firms
demonstrates the enormity of the threat posed by patent trolls. Technology
9. Id.
10. The Patent Troll Problem, supra note 4 (Patent group constantly refers to trolls as
“PAEs”).
11. Gina Hall, Tech Companies Draw Large Amount of Attention from Patent Trolls,
SILICON VALLEY BUS. J.: BIZJOURNALS.COM (July 13, 2015 7:30 AM), http://www.
bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2015/07/13/tech-companies-draw-large-amount-of-attentionfrom.html.
12. See Todd Spangler, Yahoo’s False Prophet: How Marissa Mayer Failed to Turn the
Company Around, VARIETY (May 24, 2016 9:06 AM), http://variety.com/2016/digital/
features/marissa-mayer-yahoo-ceo-1201781310/.
13. Flaherty, supra note 3.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss1/3

2017]

The Future of Patent Troll Legislation

43

companies have grown ever more protective and have launched quasialliances against patent trolls. 14 Several state legislatures have attempted to
protect companies from this specific threat even though patents are a
federal issue. 15 Vermont was the first state to enact legislation targeted at
preventing extortion in the form of patent assertion,16 and it is no
coincidence that the technology industry in Vermont provides “40% of the
payroll in the state.” 17 For industries with such an important role in the
state’s economy, legislators will try to pass anything to protect those
businesses and keep them in state. Whatever the companies viewed as a
threat themselves, the state legislators viewed as a threat to the state
economy. And though the technology industry includes behemoth-sized
companies, bleeding that amount of cash to low-level extortionists cannot
be an action for any company—regardless of size—that wishes to survive.
B. Expansion From Silicon Valley To The Energy Business
With such an easy setup, lucrative rewards, and low risk of liability or
legal consequences, patent trolls easily target technology 18 companies and
have now expanded into new areas, including the energy industry. In 2013,
patent trolls shifted—or at least broadened—their focus from targeting
technology companies to the energy industry. 19 The technology industry is
rumored to be oversaturated with trolls, and technology companies continue
to become more aggressive in their litigation tactics toward these

14. See How LOT Works, LOTNETWORK (2016), http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works/
(Companies that have formed alliances specifically to stop patent trolls).
15. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. Abby Isaacs, New Report Shows Tech Industry Makes Up a Quarter of Vermont’s
Economy, NBC5 (Apr. 14, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://www.mynbc5.com/article/new-reportshows-tech-industry-makes-up-a-quarter-of-vermont-s-economy/3326875
(internal
quotations omitted).
18. The use of “Silicon Valley” and “technology” (used interchangeably) here is
referring to computer and internet service based technology separate from such tools used in
the energy industry to place companies such as Google and Schlumberger in their
corresponding fields while ignoring the numerous overlaps. The author recognizes that the
term “technology” may be viewed broadly enough to encompass any patentable subject
matter. Also, Silicon Valley is a generalization and in this context does not include several
large technology companies such as IBM.
19. Jayme Partridge & Todd Patterson, Patent Trolls Find New Target in Energy
Sector: Study Found 200 Percent Increase in Nonpracticing-Entity Lawsuits during the First
Half of 2015, ENERGY: A SPECIAL REPORT, THE NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 28, 2015).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

44

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

extortionists. 20 These factors may have pushed extorting NPEs to look for
fresh meat, and energy companies are good prospects for settling early to
avoid expensive litigation.21 Studies estimate that patent lawsuits filed by
NPEs against energy companies tripled between 2006 and 2015, 22 and the
first six months of 2015 had twice as many NPE patent lawsuits as the first
six months of 2014. 23 This data demonstrates that these energy-targeted
troll suits have increased exponentially, with no signs of slowing down.
This shift may also have roots in patent case law dealing with the scope
of numerous technology patents. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
Alice owned a series of patents that included claims to a common financial
process that safeguards against one party in a settlement or agreement not
performing their half by holding the payments until both sides have
submitted them. 24 The Court criticized Alice as trying to get a patent on a
simple process they knew would be computerized in the future without
actually trying to produce such a program or new idea themselves; it was
basic logic that it would be computerized and that there was money to be
made if the process could be owned. The decision to deny this broad type of
patent, that brings no transformation to an abstract idea, has barred all
process patent claims that simply take a business practice and attempt to
add to it by making computers do the grunt work. 25 Had the patent been for
a machine specifically made for this program that actually did the process
described, there may have been a different outcome. The Court based its
decision that the process and code in the claims were not patentable on the
fact that such a basic concept falls under the patent-ineligible abstract ideas
of Section 101. 26 Since many patent trolls base their arguments on a broad
interpretation of their software patents, Alice resulted in a setback for trolls
in the technology industry—but not as large as one might hope. 27 Though a
mix of good and bad news for the technology industry, Alice may be no
20. John Barr & Tim Grieger, Patent Trolls Target Oil and Gas Industry, ENERGY
EXECUTIVE MAG. (2015), http://energy-executive.com/blog/143-patent-trolls-target-oil-andgas-industry
[http://web.archive.org/web/20161222153343/http://energy-executive.com/
blog/143-patent-trolls-target-oil-and-gas-industry].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19.
24. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2352-53 (2014).
25. Id. at 2359-60.
26. Id. at 2360.
27. Amanda Ciccatelli, Software Patents Get Struck Down After Alice, INSIDE COUNSEL
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2017/02/01/software-patents-get-struckdown-after-alice.
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news for the energy sector, which has fewer computerized processes that
were targeted. This case may have contributed to the shift of patent trolls
toward the energy industry, but it also outlines one of the main tactics in
legislation against patent trolls, which seeks to limit the scope of claim
interpretation in an infringement suit.
There are many possible reasons for targeting the energy industry, but
the fast-paced and high-risk nature of the business itself creates the type of
pragmatic settling that patent trolls desire. The broad range of technology,
equipment, and processes needed to compete successfully in the oil
industry, and the level of specialized knowledge, leads to more patents in
general and thus to more patent lawsuits.28 The energy sector’s high costs
(including legal costs) and overall market size also attract patent trolls.29 In
such a large industry, with companies of every size nationwide, it is
difficult to discern between patent trolls and a small business rightfully
protecting its invention from infringement. To spur on this confusion,
patent trolls usually form a separate shell corporation to hold just one group
of patents involved in one lawsuit. 30 Then demand letters come from
unfamiliar corporate entities that add to the illusion of risk of future
litigation costs and infringement damages for the recipient energy company.
Creating this shell company prevents the patent troll from losing anything
more than the lawsuit and limits the possibility that its future claims or
business for the specific patents will be affected since the troll has no actual
products, services, or material assets.31 The ability to hide behind a
corporate veil presents a particularly troublesome problem. Patent trolls are
not only increasing the number of cases brought overall, but each troll
brings more cases to court—up to an average of seven cases per NPE in
2015—because they are enabled by hiding behind shell companies. 32
In addition to the highly-competitive nature of the business, energy
companies must protect their interests and technology to survive the
current, large, and prolonged decline in oil prices. For the past two years,
the price of crude has averaged roughly $50 per barrel. 33 The last time they
sunk that low at the end of 2008, prices quickly returned to around $75
28. Barr & Grieger, supra note 20.
29. Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19.
30. Id. at ¶ 6.
31. Id.
32. David J. Levy & Nicholaus E. Floyd, Update: Patent Trolls Are Targeting the
Energy Industry, MORGAN LEWIS (June 29, 2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/
update-patent-trolls-are-targeting-the-energy-industry.
33. WTI Crude, CNBC.COM (May 18, 2017), http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/@CL.1.
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within a couple of months. 34 The prolonged slump in the energy industry
has resulted in an overall increase in patent litigation, especially in oilfield
service and equipment companies. 35 There is a direct correlation between
the drop in oil and the increase in competitor-on-competitor patent
litigation, the likes of which the industry has not seen since the late 1980s. 36
As it became important to cut costs while still protecting the current assets
of the company to maintain survival, energy companies faced adverse
incentives both to avoid risk by settling with patent trolls and litigate threats
to their assets. When the industry becomes less profitable, patents become a
source of opportunity, with possibilities of profits from both future products
and from litigation. Patents provide proof that the company can do
something no one else can, which can be a wonderful tool for increasing
market share. 37 Competitors turn on each other and fight tooth and nail for
an opportunity to bring in profits from their patent portfolios through
litigation, in which a win not only helps the company’s bottom line but
directly weakens the competition.38 The general increase in litigation is not
solely due to patent trolls, but their increasing persistence in a time of
economic downturn in the industry has added to the stress of the situation
caused by other factors. This frustrating dichotomy between avoiding risk
and having a deep need to protect valuable assets has prompted an outcry
for legislation to decrease patent troll extortion and the waste that comes
from their practices.
II. State Responses To Patent Trolls And Their Problems
Like most litigation, patent cases are costly; on average, a patent case
costs more than one million dollars to defend. 39 In addition to the price tag,
patent litigation consists of a long and arduous process despite jurisdictional
efforts to streamline the process. While there is some dispute over how

34. Id.
35. Nushin Huq, Patent Infringement Cases Increase in Oil and Gas Business,
BLOOMBERG LAW: BIG LAW BUSINESS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/patentinfringement-cases-increase-in-oil-and-gas-business/.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19.
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much monetary damage comes directly from patent trolls, research suggests
that the damage is significant, reaching multi-billions of dollars. 40
The first states to enact legislation against patent trolls, like Vermont, did
so with the goal of cutting litigation costs and extortion in their technology
industry. 41 The increase in targeting the energy industry led to states with
more of a reliance on energy—like Oklahoma and Texas—to pass
legislation in an attempt to stabilize the state economy.
In Texas, seventeen of the twenty-five biggest companies by revenue
headquartered in the state are oil and gas companies. 42 Without counting
any of the numerous out-of-state companies that contribute to the energy
industry in Texas, these seventeen companies had a combined revenue of
more than $800 billion in 2013. 43 So, when oil went from nearly $100 per
barrel in June 2014 to less than $50 for two whole years, the implications
for the state’s economy—which now makes up 9% of United States’
economic output—were far-reaching. 44 More than half of the 172 oil and
gas producers and service providers that filed for bankruptcy from 2015 to
October 2016 have done so in Texas courts. 45 Between the end of 2014 and
Fall 2016, Texas lost more than 91,000 jobs related to the energy industry. 46
It is clear that Texas needs to do whatever necessary to assist its energy
companies and bolster its economy, and the state legislature is positioned to
most quickly deal with this kind of significant economic and tax loss. The
loss of business, jobs, and taxable revenue very likely caused Texas’ antitrolling legislation at the end of 2015. 47

40. James Bessen, The Evidence Is In; Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, THE HARVARD
BUS. R., Nov. 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurtinnovation (Discusses research showing patent trolls cost $29 billion in legal costs in 2011).
41. Isaacs, supra note 17.
42. Office of the Governor of Texas: Economic Development and Tourism, Texas Top
Tier: The Largest Companies Headquartered in Texas, TEXAS.GOV (2014),
http://gov.texas.gov/files/ecodev/Texas_Largest_Companies.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Erin Ailworth & Ben Leubsdorf, Texas, Once A Star, Becomes a Drain on the U.S.
Economy, THE WALL STREET J. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-once-astar-becomes-a-drag-on-the-u-s-economy-1476264601.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
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Oklahoma passed its anti-patent trolling legislation in May 2014, before
the latest drop in oil prices. 48 Oklahoma may no longer completely rely on
oil as it used to, but oil is still the most significant factor in the state’s
economy. 49 Though patents are a federal issue and Oklahoma tends to shy
away from regulation, these laws can be used as a specific example of how
the state treats its own businesses. Just like the legislature of its southern
neighbor, keeping energy companies in Oklahoma, attracting more business
to the state, and increasing taxable revenue and jobs were all likely factors
in passing this piece of business-friendly legislation.
Overall, there are twenty-nine states that have anti-patent trolling
legislation and three more that have proposed versions to the state
legislature. 50 However, patents are exclusively subject to federal
jurisdiction, so state governments cannot address the complicated problem
of patent trolling with any real definiteness, and the differences in laws may
lead to many problems.
A. Problems With State Legislation
The state legislation varies depending on the goals of those states that
have applied them, which may be one of the major motivators for the
federal government to take action. Each state takes a slightly different
approach, and each has its own problems including discouragement of prelawsuit discussion, limited state power within patent law, possible increase
in litigation, and large variations among the states on a federal issue. None
of the laws seem to be affecting the number of patent troll lawsuits.
1. Decrease In Pre-Lawsuit Discussion May Cause A Rise In Litigation
States may try to change the law around the procedure and processes for
certain areas of patent lawsuits, but patents and most of their related
litigation occur at the federal level. States have taken different approaches,
but the majority of the laws affect how lawyers in that state conduct patent
infringement issues outside of court. With the lack of ability to change the
nature of the lawsuits, legislators turn to what they can control, usually in
the form of demand letter (and other pre-lawsuit communications)
48. Phillip C. Swain, Patent Troll Watch: States Are Pushing Patent Trolls Away from
the Legal Line, FOLEYHOAG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/
ebooks-and-white-papers/2016/march/state-ag-patent-troll-watch-march-2016.
49. Monty Evans, Oklahoma Economic Indicators, OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
COMMISSION (Apr. 2017), https://www.ok.gov/oesc_web/documents/lmiEconIndPub.pdf.
50. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2 (showing mining and utilities together as a
majority of the state GDP).
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content. 51 Miscommunication between parties, or no communication at all,
can breed a ripe environment for unnecessary lawsuits. One of the main
problems of these laws is the hindrance of well-intended pre-lawsuit
communication coupled with no signs of preventing actual patent troll
extortions. 52
One of the pre-lawsuit paths of destroying patent trolls outlaws “bad
faith assertions of patent infringement” in an attempt to stop patent trolls
from sending out near-identical copies of vague demand letters asking for a
settlement on a patent they have not yet divulged. 53 This bad-faith element
intends to separate patent trolls from legitimate patent infringement suits,
but the potential for its high misuse as an overreaching defense by
infringers must be considered when choosing a venue. 54 For protection in
these jurisdictions, it is common that all correspondence is kept on record in
case a bad faith assertion complaint arises out of either party. 55 The states
often treat the legislation as a mostly idle threat, allowing only the attorney
general to instigate civil investigation or actions in court, with formal
complaints needed to begin such an investigation.56 The difficulty has
landed not on the trolls as planned but on the lawful patent holders seeking
to properly assert their rights, forcing them into vague communication with
possible infringers. While all the state legislation has some form of bad
faith assertion as part of the law, 57 the many variations in definition bring
confusion and fear into any pre-lawsuit discussion, causing less of this type
of communication and a possible increase in litigation.
To avoid violating these types of legislation, a company asserting a good
faith demand letter may have to include sensitive information to a
competitor or possible opposing party. 58 The information for a now-proper
demand letter often requires information about which claims of which
patent are in question for infringement. 59 However, giving out such
information in the very first contact with a possible infringer is a dangerous

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Erich Spangenberg, Unintended Consequences of Patent Troll Legislation, IPNAV
(2016),
http://www.ipnav.com/blog/unintended-consequences-of-patent-troll-legislation/
(internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Huang, King, & Rawson, supra note 2.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Spangenberg, supra note 53.
59. Id.
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legal move. 60 If the other party has specific information about the patent
claims and the company that owns them, that party can file its own lawsuit
or declaratory judgment action in its favor. 61 Many first letters keep a mood
of professionalism, yet still have a very amicable tone to avoid such
unnecessary jumps in litigation. 62 Keeping the first letter light provides a
chance for both parties to sign a confidentiality agreement and a
forbearance agreement, which benefits all parties involved. 63 Specifically
allowing for these kinds of communications in the legislation may prevent
unnecessary lawsuits, but none of the current legislation specifically
provides for this exception.64 The current state legislation is still fairly new,
and almost none of it has been put to the test in court.65
This forced shift of letters from seeking general information to giving
out very important details may cause a complete change in the beginning
approach to patent infringement suits. Instead of gauging the other party
through protected communication, the options are now to either give them
all the information necessary to bring a lawsuit themselves or simply go
straight to suing the other party without warning or negotiations of a
licensing deal. 66 For how little this will stop patent trolls, it creates more
grief for people the legislation means to protect.
2. Large Variation In State Laws
There are twenty-nine different pieces of legislation with different
wording and different approaches to preventing patent troll extortion. 67
Though those states are trying to accomplish the same goals, there are
significant differences in the laws as a whole. 68 In general, the states’ laws
range from broad legislation that gives courts the power to decide what
factors are more important in each case, to narrow definitions that give
exact examples of what determines bad faith assertions.69 The major
differences occur in the definition of bad faith, who can bring an action
against a patent troll, and what actions actually make an entity a patent troll
in those states. The following consider the content of three states’ statutory
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
Id.
Spangenberg, supra note 53.
Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
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attempts to stop bad faith demand letters shows the range of differences in
state laws against patent trolls.
a) Vermont
Vermont lists nine factors for a judge to consider when determining
whether a party “has made a bad faith assertion of patent
infringement. . . .” 70 The nine factors are generally put into the following
categories: action taken or not taken by the asserter, the contents of the
demand letter, and the nature of the claim. 71 The factors concerning the
information given to the other party include requirements for a demand
letter to contain the patent number in question, “the name and address of the
patent owner,” and “factual allegations” relating to the specific
infringement of the patent claims. 72 The other factors concern actions taken
(or not taken) before or after initial communication to properly abide by the
first requirements, to perform analysis of the claims, and general
consideration for deceptive, wasteful, meritless, or repetitious court
action. 73 The law focuses on what should be done before the plaintiff brings
a patent infringement complaint to ensure that unnecessary settlements are
not extorted from Vermont individuals and corporations. To achieve that
goal, a judge wields the power to determine bad faith with loose factors,
plus any that the court deems relevant.74 This gives the Attorney General
the power to act on behalf of the target in civil court as well as a private
cause of action with a multitude of available damages. 75
Many states have followed Vermont’s lead by creating a broad list of
factors falling into categories of contents of the demand letter, actions taken
or not taken by the troll, and the nature of the claim. 76 Vermont has faced
complaints from disgruntled lawyers, but similarly, so have most of the
states that tried to copy or improve upon what was provided in the Vermont
legislation. 77 The immense flexibility suggests that the statutes are more of
a scare tactic to be used for threats than an enforceable law.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (West 2017).
Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, § 4197(b)(1) (West 2017).
Id. § 4197.
See id. §§ 4195-97.
Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
Id.
Spangenberg, supra note 53.
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b) Texas
The Texas law lists three definite and specific ways that the patent troll
asserts a bad faith patent claim and is liable for possible damages. 78 The
most blatant is when the party states in a demand letter that they have filed
a lawsuit concerning the patent infringement when they have not. 79 Next,
Texas established criteria for whether a claim is “objectively baseless,”
which include claiming a patent or right to license a patent which the sender
does not possess, trying to use an invalid patent, or using activity that
happened after the expiration of the patent.80 Finally, the communication
must have the specifications of who asserts a claim, the patent concerned,
and “at least one product, service, or technology” that has infringed the
patent. 81
The Texas law differs the most from the Vermont law in the definition of
bad faith assertion and the possible actions. 82 The two state’s laws occupy
separate ends on the range of narrow and broad definitions and powers
given. Though both states presumably passed their respective laws with
different industries in mind, and Texas had a couple of years to see how
other states would form their laws, both laws encounter similar problems.
While Vermont more loosely defines its bad faith definition and allows for
a private cause of action, Texas has limited the action and provided no
instruction or mechanism on how to bring the suit to the Attorney General’s
attention. 83 This may suggest the Texas legislature wanted to have a law
that encourages potential patent troll victims to stay in state while not
damaging the unique, plaintiff-friendly, and patent-heavy phenom of the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (“EDTX”). 84
c) Oklahoma
Oklahoma’s law falls between Vermont and Texas, with a strong list of
specific acts that are not allowed and another list of actions and parties that
are exceptions to the rule. The forbidden actions include any written or
electronic communication falsely claiming to file a patent suit, a consistent
78. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.952 (West 2017).
79. Id. § 17.952(b)(1).
80. Id. § 17.952(b)(2).
81. Id.
82. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
83. Id.
84. Rob Pegoraro, Consumer Electronics Industry to Government: Do Something About
Patent Trolls, YAHOO TECH (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/consumerelectronics-industry-to-government-do-230545239.html.
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pattern of threatened litigation with no filing, or any communication with
assertions that lack a reasonable basis in fact or law. 85 The law also
contains many options specifically stated to show what assertions may be
seen as unreasonable. 86 The exceptions to the rule include letters advising
others on the right to license or enforce the patent, communicating the
availability of sale, notices of infringement, or any letter that seeks a license
or compensation for infringement of a patent that is not in bad faith. Also,
the statute does not apply to universities, a licensing firm on behalf of
universities, or any patent owner involved in substantial research or
manufacturing.
While Oklahoma has many examples and factors for what constitutes a
bad faith demand letter, the broad exceptions seem to make the law hard to
enforce. Any party that makes a product or works for a university, is not in
danger of breaking these restrictions. Those exceptions directly address
several problems that can arise from multiple definitions of patent troll. The
law consists of hardline rules with many exceptions, but it may have been
better if the legislature set up both as factors rather than strict rules. The
current setup may make it possible for patent trolls to fall under one of the
exceptions and gives no definition of bad faith, but it defines what makes an
illegal demand letter in a clearer way than Texas or Vermont.
While Vermont was the first, and Texas has special circumstances
surrounding its law, most of the states with anti-patent-troll laws remain in
the middle of the two laws, like Oklahoma and Virginia. Virginia provides
many factors to consider in the bad faith definition while also providing
several factors that count toward good faith actions.87 The law, like most,
provides investigation and penalties through the Attorney General but does
not form a private cause of action. However, it clearly and easily allows for
a complaint to be made with the Attorney General and even has a patent
troll unit for that specific use.88 Most states have attempted to make a
business-favorable law without interfering with the federal system (like
Vermont) or being too narrow (like Texas). Unfortunately, none of the
current laws has made any noticeable difference in the number or cases
with patent trolls or for patent infringement cases in general, both of which
have continued to increase.89

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 112A (West 2017).
Id. at § 112A(3).
VA. CODE ANN. § 591-2152.86 (West 2017).
Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.
See Barr & Grieger, supra note 20; see also, Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19.
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3. Patent Troll Cases Continue To Grow And Evolve
As the patent landscape evolves, with a general increase in the filing and
active protection of patents, the techniques used by patent trolls evolves
along with it. Many of the earlier patent trolls have now moved from
asserting patents to focus on less risky legal operations. A lawyer that
worked with TechSearch, a firm considered one of the first patent trolls
(and may be the root of the term after they barred defendants in their case
from calling them “patent extortionists”), announced that he was ready to
leave the business due to its higher cost and risk. 90 Though older patent
trolls may think the area too saturated with smaller groups trying to
capitalize on their patents, this switch keeps the threat of patent trolls alive
and well. 91 TechSearch held several very broad patents that it asserted
against as many people as it could.92 The famous reputation of the troll
previously helped it win more settlements, but now those types of
companies are singled out and intentionally taken to court.
The heightened risk of getting taken to court, coupled with what some
lawyers say are greatly increased costs in IPRs, has created an environment
for taking down these big, broad patent trolls, but has also allowed for
smaller entities to bring an onslaught of smaller suits against as many
people as possible. 93 The “shotgun approach” defines this tactic because
there are multiple chances to hit a target—as long as one hits, the other
misses do not usually cause any harm. 94 The shotgun approach comes with
a smaller success rate and smaller returns per threat or suit, but there are
many entities able to thrive on this platform. The repetitious mass
communication starts to more closely resemble email spam or mass
telemarketing, and this increase likely led state legislators to change the
demand letters necessary to carry out this plan. If the new shotgun demand
letter approach stops working, patent trolls will likely evolve to a new
method just as they have in the past.
90. Joe Mullin, Original “Patent Troll” May Call It Quits, Says There’s NO Money in
It: Have we passed peak patent troll? Some of the field’s pioneers say yes., ARSTECHNICA
(June 10, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/original-patenttroll-may-call-it-quits-says-theres-no-money-in-it/.
91. Joe Mullin, Trolls Made 2015 One of the Biggest Years Ever For Patent Lawsuits:
Go Ask Alice: The Tables are turning in defendant’s favor, but suits abound, ARSTECHNICA
(Jan. 5, 2016, 11:38 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/despite-law-changes2015-saw-a-heap-of-patent-troll-lawsuits/.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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4. Accusing Company Of Being A Troll May Cause Unfair Damage
On the other side of anti-patent-troll legislation is the damage that can be
caused to a legitimate assertion of patent rights provided and protected by
the Federal Constitution. The mere use of the term “patent troll” in the
media and scholarship on the subject could make it more difficult to
rightfully protect against true patent infringement. 95 For a small inventor to
be able to use the patent system correctly, he often needs to enlist the help
of a patent enforcement specialist.96 And the easiest way to pay for these
specialists is to license out, partner with, or even sell the patent through a
non-practicing entity that has the resources to make the patent profitable. 97
Most legislation protects large companies—more likely to get an onslaught
of infringement claims and settle to vague demands—from patent trolls but
ignores the inverse situation of the small inventor trying to enforce his own
claim or defend a frivolous claim brought by a large business (not a troll in
this case but rather an “ogre”). 98 Legislators may not be ignoring this on
purpose, but large businesses that have more of an effect on taxes and
employment numbers, and the state’s economy, are very likely the target
for protection of these laws.
Large technology and energy companies are often viewed as patent trolls
themselves. For instance, IBM, which filed 7,534 patents in 2014 and 7,355
in 2015, reports more than $1 billion in annual revenue directly from
licensing, and an inquiry into their research and development department
suggests it likely profits around $25 billion a year from its inventions.99
Considering the sheer volume of patents IBM owns, there is no doubt that
they have spent a lot of time and money protecting those patents. Patent
extortion legislation may enable some larger companies to destroy
competition and profit from others’ inventions that do not actually infringe,
which is very similar to what it is designed to stop.
Many schools and courtrooms have begun to notice the negative effects
of using the term “patent troll” to identify a non-practicing entity, or in
some cases anyone who has asserted their right to protect their lawfully
95. Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, And Patent Reform,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 116-17 (2015).
96. Ron Katznelson, How Misleading Scholarship Contorts Patent Enforcement into a
Patent Troll Fable, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/23/
patent-troll-fable/id=56014/.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. John C. Dvorak, IBM is the World’s Biggest Patent Troll, PCMAG.COM (May 4,
2016), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2493155,00.asp.
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owned patent. 100 Several courts have prevented litigants from using the
term “troll” in the courtroom and in certain motions, believing the way
media and academia have portrayed patent trolls causes prejudice against
the accused party whether they are an extorting NPE or not. 101 In the
popular radio show and podcast, This American Life, the episode “When
Patents Attack” delves into the oddities of the patent troll practices and the
Eastern District of Texas. 102 Though the show focuses on a large and wellknown patent troll, Intellectual Ventures, and its older techniques of patent
assertion, the entirety of the show calls out patent trolls in general,
including the more evolved modern versions.103 They also focus on the role
of EDTX and its unusually high number of patent suits. 104 The district hears
the majority of the country’s patent cases, and it has proven an entertaining
road stop for reporters and journalists to visit the empty offices of the patent
trolls in Marshall, Texas that clearly only exist to get favorable
jurisdiction. 105
Similar to the radio show on patents, a popular segment on Last Week
Tonight with John Oliver discussed many great points and problems
surrounding patent trolls but vilified some very common and accepted legal
practices. 106 For example, the host mentions how patent trolls do not make
anything and are thus not useful, which shows a misunderstanding of the
importance of lawful NPEs. 107 He also blamed trial lawyers for the failing
of a federal anti-patent-troll bill in the Senate, but there have been so many
attempts and versions of these bills, with their own groups of problems,
springing from many different areas, that it is hard to blame one group for
such a complicated law.108
Companies are branded as patent trolls quite often, whether they earn the
labeling or not. Many commonly refer to IPNav as a patent troll, but it is
difficult to prove whether such a large company is truly a patent troll.
100. Lee, supra note 95, at 116-17.
101. Id. at 117.
102. This American Life: When Patents Attack!, Chicago Public Radio (July 22, 2011),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO television broadcast Apr. 19,
2015). (The portion of the program discussing patent trolls and legislative reform has been
made available for free viewing on YouTube on the show’s official YouTube channel,
“LastWeekTonight.”).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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However, IPNav has sued more than 1,600 companies in the past 5 years,
more than any in the patent field.109 With that many lawsuits, it would be
hard to say that all are baseless or that all are firmly founded. And if the
company were to face ruin because of its riskier cases, that would not be
fair to the inventors or holders of its other patents. IPNav is likely not in
any danger of being mislabeled considering its own website describes it as a
service to turn “idle patents into cash cows,” but there are similar NPEs that
suffer from the bad reputation that comes along with being labeled a patent
troll. 110
The bad reputation that comes with filing bad patent suits against others
is well deserved, but the widespread misuse of the term may lead to even
more confusion and fear from someone faced with a possible patent
infringement suit from a real troll. The damaging effects of this rhetoric are
some of the main reasons that state and federal legislators must include
clear definitions of actions constituting a troll in their legislation if it is
meant to benefit patent holders.
5. Large Portion Of Cases Are All In Eastern District Of Texas
A large problem with state legislation stems from the federal jurisdiction
of patent claims. Moreover, a single district hears the majority of the
cases—a small town in eastern Texas. One of the more interesting aspects
of the United States patent law, the Eastern District of Texas appeared on
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver111, This American Life 112, the CBS
jury-consultant show Bull, 113 and more.
As discussed on the excerpt of Last Week Tonight, patent trolls favor this
venue for litigation because of its quick trial periods and plaintiff-friendly
decisions. 114 The show used the example of a troll that sued a company who
helps disabled persons find employment. 115 The company had planned to
sue in the EDTX because suits filed there generally favor plaintiffs, which
in turn creates an incentive to settle. 116 Frequent plaintiffs and defendants

109. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, NEW YORK
TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-suean-alert-to-corporate-america.html.
110. Id.
111. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents, supra note 106.
112. This American Life: When Patents Attack!, supra note 102.
113. Bull: Callisto (CBS television broadcast Oct. 11, 2016).
114. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents, supra note 106.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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have been pouring money into the local economy. For example, Samsung
built the outdoor skating rink next to the courthouse, hoping that jurors
would associate Samsung with good things in their community. 117
The Eastern District of Texas has become somewhat of a lightning rod
for patent litigation, and many have speculated as to why the small area has
more patent cases than any other venue and whether it is good for those
cases to end up with only a handful of judges. 118 The court hears around
forty-four percent of all patent lawsuits in the United States. 119 However,
this may be more of a venue problem than a patent legislation problem.
In 1988, Congress changed the general venue law, which was interpreted
as removing the special rule that restricted venue choices.120 Essentially,
plaintiffs could choose the most favorable venue for their lawsuit. 121 A
study by Villanova and Santa Clara law school professors for PatentlyO
revealed that a slight change in patent venue laws could prevent sixty-two
percent of EDTX cases from being filed there, thus curtailing the supposed
plaintiff advantage.122 The new change in venue law through TC Heartland
could significantly damage patent trolls’ home-field advantage in East
Texas, but any businesses already based in Texas remain unaffected.
Not only does the court currently boast an oddly high number of patent
suits, but NPEs initiate ninety-five percent of patent cases in the EDTX.123
Though not all NPEs are trolls, trolls are NPEs and this lopsided number
suggests that patent troll activity does not happen more in any other forum.
Many have theorized as to how or why this phenomenon started, but the
numbers clearly show that something is different. While defendants win on
summary judgment in the average case involving overly abstract patents
seventy-one percent of the time nationally, in EDTX only twenty-seven
percent result in summary judgment against the plaintiff.124 These decisions
have changed in most venues due to Alice which resulted in throwing out
117. Id.
118. Eastern District Judges, TXED.USCOURTS.GOV (2017), http://www.txed.uscourts.
gov/?q=eastern-district-judges.
119. Pegoraro, supra note 84.
120. Colleen Chien & Michael Risch, Guest Post: What Would Happen to Patent Cases
if They Couldn’t all be Filed in Texas?, PATENTLYO (Mar. 11, 2016), http://patentlyo.
com/patent/2016/03/happen-patent-couldnt.html.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Mullin, supra note 91.
124. Joe Mullin, Why Patent Trolls Go to East Texas, Explained. ARSTECHNICA (Aug.
2015),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/08/why-patent-trolls-go-to-east-texasexplained/.
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many software patents and other broad or abstract claims. 125 The fact that
nearly half of all patent cases are heard in a district following a Supreme
Court decision differently than all other forums may not have been a reason
to force a change in the court’s actions. But this was certainly reason
enough to prevent baseless venue shopping.
The immense number of cases involving an unusually high amount of
NPEs seem to be the perfect conditions for patent trolls. The number of
cases allows them to hide in plain sight while still apparently choosing the
venue based on the court’s experience, the case history of patent litigation,
and the area’s openness to intellectual property owners. The town of Tyler,
Texas even has a website proclaiming how the whole area is “IP
Friendly.” 126 While this district has its own problems of appearing corrupt,
many legitimate reasons exist for picking such a venue. Having a court
well-versed in patent law is a rarity, and it saves time and money to deal
with smaller cases in a venue that has seen more than its fair share of patent
cases, even if the outcome favors one side consistently. Defendants likely
will waive personal jurisdiction to still take advantage of the speedy patent
docket in EDTX. Special circumstances like the Eastern District of Texas
make it difficult to find an effective state law against patent extortion and
make it equally complicated for any possible federal legislation.
III. The Forced Federal Response To Patent Trolls
With the many problems stemming from state legislation, the pressure
increases for federal legislation to fix the patent troll problem. Still, no
consensus exists as to which federal approach would be effective to impede
patent trolls while avoiding complicating patent litigation. Past and current
versions of federal law include changes in both patent law and civil
procedure that attack patent trolls at different angles, and both aim to solve
the problem single-handedly.
Pressure for federal legislation comes from many different areas, but all
appear to be concerned that patent trolls will continue to stifle innovation,
the main motivation and purpose of the U.S. patent system. 127 Calls for
congressional action from businesses, state governments, and even the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) have been growing
125. Id.
126. Julie Samuels, The VENUE Act: It’s Time to Get Patent Trolls out of East Texas,
ENGINE (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.engine.is/news/issues/the-venue-act-its-time-to-getpatent-trolls-out-of-east-texas/6580.
127. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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louder and continue to be very public. The 2016 Consumer Electronics
Show in Las Vegas had a director from the USPTO attend as a keynote
speaker, marking the first time anyone from the Office has spoken at the
large technology show, and giving credence to the growing concern of
patent trolls in innovative industries. 128 The main focus of the director’s
speech was that Congress needed to enact legislation to protect these
industries from the costly price of dealing with patent trolls.129 President
Obama, large technology and petroleum industry leaders, and many state
governments have all supported federal legislation for patent infringement
reform specifically for extortion—though it has led to several attempts in
the legislature, nothing has been passed into law.130
It is somewhat unusual for an issue that seems so one-sided in the
public’s eyes to have garnered so much attention. The public outcry and
media attention could possibly stem from lobbying efforts from the large
and powerful industries that continually find themselves targeted, or it
could just come from patent trolls’ significant, negative economic impact.
Some journalists suggest trial lawyers have actually lobbied against the
federal legislation just so they can continue working on baseless lawsuits,
but this pessimistic view inaccurately represents patent attorneys and
oversimplifies how patent trolls cause economic damage. 131 Either way, this
problem has gained the attention of all areas of government involved in
patents and commerce. Yet there still has been no consensus on what a
plausible solution will look like. The growing problems are likely to be met
with more outcry but unlikely to be met with any effective federal
legislation.
A. TROL Act And TPTP Act
There have been many efforts at federal legislation, but they have all
come to a stalemate or flat-out failed. For instance, the Targeting Rogue
and Opaque Letters (“TROL”) Act sought to minimize the “abusive use” of
demand letters by any patent-asserting entity, similar to most current state
legislation. 132 The TROL Act enables courts “to impose sanctions or

128. Pegoraro, supra note 84.
129. Id.
130. Flaherty, supra note 3.
131. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents, supra note 106.
132. Michael Su, Lionel Lavenue & Ben Cassady, Patent Reform Beyond the Innovation
Act: the VENUE Act, LAW360 (May 9, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
788794/patent-reform-beyond-the-innovation-act-the-venue-act.
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reduced damages on those parties improperly sending demand letters.” 133
The act even called for Federal Trade Commission penalties for the
distributors who do not follow the sanctions. 134 Another failed bill was
Trade Protection Not Troll Protection (“TPTP”) Act from March 2016,
which aimed to use the U.S. International Trade Commission to enforce
regulations and penalties on extorting NPEs. 135
These are just two of many pieces of legislation136 that Congress never
seriously examined. The state laws could be a sort of experiment to see how
similar federal legislation might be effective, but the lack of state power
over patents itself keeps those laws from being effective. If the federal
government wants to take patent trolls seriously, it must be willing to take
some action, even if likely to fail.
B. Federal Legislation Is Still Necessary In Addition To Supreme Court
Venue Decision
The TC Heartland venue case may solve venue problems, but it will not
likely stop trolls. 137 This case decided whether the patent venue statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b)—which says that patent lawsuits “may be brought in the
judicial district where the defendant resides” and was interpreted as residing
in the state of incorporation—will be the only source for venue choices in
patent lawsuits. 138 The alternative, which had also been used, was 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c)—which allowed for corporate entities to reside in multiple
judicial districts in certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court had made a similar ruling before in Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. 139 There, the Court decided that the
stricter § 1400(b) would apply to patent cases, allowing only for venue in
the state of incorporation, But Fourco Glass was essentially overruled when
the legislature amended § 1391(c) in 1988. 140 Since then, the circuits
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dennis Crouch, Patent Venue at the Supreme Court: Correcting a 26-year Mistake,
PATENTLYO (Sept. 14, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/09/patent-supremecorrecting.html.
138. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC, SCOTUSBLOG: SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tcheartland-llc-v-kraft-food-brands-group-llc/ (at time of publishing, no official opinion has
been released).
139. Crouch, supra note 137.
140. Id.
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remained split which caused the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Though
purely procedural, this decision could provide an avenue for stopping patent
trolls through restricting venue (specifically away from the Eastern District
of Texas).
Before TC Heartland went to the Supreme Court, federal legislation
designed to restrict venue shopping in patent cases made its way through
Congress before being stalled. A study for PatentlyO showed that a slight
change in patent venue laws would prevent sixty-two percent of Eastern
District of Texas cases from being filed there, and from having a supposed
plaintiff advantage. 141 However, now that suits brought against corporations
in EDTX must be against those incorporated or that “ha[ve] committed acts
of infringement and ha[ve] a regular and established place of business,”142
in Texas—which will decrease the overall lawsuit filings by patent trolls—
it may also increase the number of demand letters they send.
The yet-to-be-passed Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination
(“VENUE”) Act and heightened pleading rules looked promising to change
the number of frivolous patent claims 143 and unfair district shopping based
on bogus places of business. 144 the effectiveness of the result of TC
Heartland will likely have a direct influence on whether this legislation will
be passed—or if it would even be needed. Before the decision, Senator
Orrin Hatch claimed that patent reform has more issues than just venue,
and, despite the Supreme Court’s decision, he would be pushing for venue
reform. 145 A federal push for patent venue reform adopting law from the
Supreme Court could be the easy-to-pass piece of legislation needed to
jumpstart other patent reform, such as an anti-patent-trolling law.
The restricted venue option from the Supreme Court would prevent a lot
of patent trolls from suing certain patent holders in the Eastern District, just
like the proposed legislation. But that only slows down the trolls; it does not
solve the problem. Patent trolls will still be able to sue a large portion of the
energy industry in EDTX because of the industry’s size in the state. Any
company incorporated or with a principal place of business in Texas is not
helped by this decision, and for the energy industry, that is a high
141. Chien & Risch, supra note 120.
142. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, No. 16-341, 2017 WL
2216934, *8 (2017).
143. Samuels, supra note 126.
144. Chien & Risch, supra note 120.
145. Gene Quinn, Hatch Says Patent Venue Reform Likely Regardless of SCOTUS
Decision in TC Heartland, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/02/16/hatch-venue-reform-likely-scotus-tc-heartland/id=78495/.
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portion. 146 There are still many options for favorable venues for patent
plaintiffs, and no amount of venue restriction will stop trolls. Instead, the
impact on patent trolls may be decided by how the federal courts of
Delaware treat patent cases because so many companies are incorporated
there. 147
As far as the scope of patents is concerned, Alice cut into the number of
computer patents targeted by patent trolls, but it has yet—and is not
likely—to make a dent in the energy industry’s patents. Adversely, a
similar approach of preventing broad patents in court through legislation
may have more of a negative effect on patents as a whole. While the energy
industry and other economic forces want to spur innovation and protect
against extortion, they also want to be able to protect their rightfully owned
patents. This type of legislation would prevent too many valid claims from
going to court, and it would only mean more economic woes for the energy
industry.
Though venue reform may protect other industries from patent trolls, the
reform will likely have a lackluster effect on the energy industry, and still in
need of further legislative protection. However, following the states’
examples of legislation may simply lead to the same more problems the
states have. Federal legislation must attack the methods of patent trolls
directly and not only rely on venue reform.
IV. Other Alternatives
Any decline in patent troll extortion will likely be due to personal
changes in approaches to patent claim settlements, not to state law. There
are likely endless ways for companies or lawyers to take action to prevent
extortion by patent trolls, but there are also courses of action (though farfetched) that may stop trolls from attacking in the first place. Only federal
legislation would have enough power to cut down on extortion whether
through fear of action or guiding law in courts where patent cases are
determined. With the high demand for action and the willingness of state
governments to experiment with their theories, it is likely that the states will
continue to try more options; the federal government will have to wait and
see what works. If the law does not work at the state level, it does not mean
it will not work at the federal level because of its jurisdiction over patents.
Therefore, the federal legislation may need to try the states’ methods as
well as some new techniques. However, the slow pace of federal legislation
146. Office of the Governor of Texas, supra note 42.
147. Quinn, supra note 145.
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means that it will likely be years—and millions (or billions) of dollars—lost
in the meantime to pesky trolls.
A. Looking To Silicon Valley And Private Agreements
The technology industry became more extreme while dealing with trolls,
which created a divide between companies who were constantly being
attacked by trolls and trying to ward off their numerous demands with
minimal settlements or licenses and companies who became so-called
patent assertion entities. These patent assertion entities may want to just
protect their intellectual property. But due to the now extreme measures
they are likely to face in the technology industry, they must aggressively
pursue patent litigation anywhere and everywhere to keep their doors open
by securing high revenues to buy other patents. It has become a vicious
cycle that continues to weigh on the technology industry and that the energy
industry must try to avoid.
Ira Blumberg, the Vice President of Intellectual Property at Lenovo,
discussed his time working for a large patent troll and that they operate for
the good of the inventors. 148 In theory, if licensing firms did not buy patents
from inventors, most would not make any money from the invention. And
for the patents to be bought, the firms must be able to make money through
patent litigation. 149 On the other (and perhaps more convincing) side, patent
trolls do much more harm than good to business and innovation, which are
cornerstones of the patent system. 150 The patent troll where Blumberg
worked, due to their size and experience, was not even concerned with the
validity of a claim because they knew that it would cost their targets
between two and three million dollars just to find out if the claim had
merit. 151 This allowed the troll to receive settlements of up to one million
dollars, which is quite different than the original technology patent trolls.
The energy industry wants to avoid those high-dollar settlements, so it must
observe what did and did not work for the technology industry. 152
The technology industry uses all its might and influence to call for
federal legislation and has successfully received legislation from states
(after all, they are the reason for the first anti-patent-troll laws). But
industry leaders have also taken it upon themselves to investigate which
148. Ira Blumberg, Why Patent Trolls Won’t Give Up, TECHCRUNCH (June 5, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/05/why-patent-trolls-wont-give-up/.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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private actions outside of the courtroom can be utilized to protect against
patent trolls. For Blumberg and Lenovo, the necessary private action
seemed to be joining a nonprofit community of companies called the
License of Transfer Network (“LOT”) 153, which works to minimize threats
from patent trolls by ensuring that their patents cannot be asserted against
another member of LOT. 154 While this particular group has many large
technology companies, banks, and automakers—such as Amazon, Lenovo,
Google, Ford, Nissan, and JPMorgan Chase 155—the entire agreement rests
on their willingness not to sue one another for patent infringement, which is
going to be a harder sell in the energy industry due to the highly
competitive (and sometimes hostile) nature between companies.
Technically, because the agreement is only for licensed patents,
Company A may still get to sue Company B for breach of contract, which
may or may not have anything to do with their patents that they share.
However, if Company A were to license or sell the patent to a licensing
firm, or perhaps even a subsidiary that is not part of LOT, then Company
A’s licensing firm cannot get damages in a patent infringement suit against
Company B. However, Company A would still be able to force Company B
into a licensing deal. Because few members would directly hold patents in
the parent company that is a member of LOT, it is essential that alliance
members not infringe against or sue one another. The incentive to stay
peaceful is upholding the value of innovation for the future of their
industries, but there are numerous benefits to these giants for making their
own intellectual property rules.
For the smaller companies involved, many entered the LOT group
through Google’s Patent Starter Program, which gave groups of patents to
fifty different startups (the only requirement for a “startup” seemed to be a
company with revenues between $500,000 and $20 million) that applied to
the program on the condition they would join LOT. 156 Considering the
strong limitations within the group, any startup that already has patents they
need to sell or license out for capital may no longer be able to do so and
will definitely get a lower price as part of LOT. Thus, even Google suggests

153. Id.
154. How LOT Works, supra note 14.
155. Our Community, LOTNETWORK (2016), http://lotnet.com/our-community/.
156. Kevin A. Rieffel, Why Google Wins by Giving Away Patents to “Startups” Willing
to Join the LOT Network, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2015/08/02/why-google-wins-by-giving-away-patents-to-startups-willing-to-join-the-lotnetwork/id=60162/.
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no company join without a significant look into future legal and monetary
ramifications. 157
Many of the same companies also participated in the Industry Patent
Purchase Program (“IP3”), which provides a special portal for the offer of
sale of patents to all members at once.158 This portal makes it easier for
inventors to sell directly to industry giants who will pay a fair value for a
patent and will hopefully make it less tempting to sell patents to patent
trolls who will never make use of the invention other than for exploitation.
This directly attacks patent trolls’ logic that they offer inventors their only
opportunity to make money. Also, a function like this is much more
advantageous for competitors to know in which areas their competition may
be investing resources. However, this alliance may do more harm than
good. If the LOT alliance applies only when the patent is sold or
transferred—and the patent cannot be asserted against any member—there
is no reason to spend money on a patent indefensible against half the giants
in the industry. If the buyer gets a patent from Google, Lenovo may directly
infringe upon it and cannot be stopped, rendering the patent worthless. If
LOT becomes a large group, they may stop some patent trolls out of sheer
intimidation, but only by gutting the worth of their own patents. It is likely
that the IP3 system will only attract patent holders who were already
opposed to selling to patent trolls because the system does not provide a
good environment for patent holders to get the best price.159 This setup
trades a federal system of protection for private agreements that seem
unlikely likely to be upheld.
B. Why Energy Cannot Copy Silicon Valley
The energy and technology industries are both prime targets for patent
trolls, but there are major differences that will lead to a divide when it
comes to how they both deal with those trolls. LOT has expressed a desire
to diversify its members to provide a wider base of protection, stating that
seventy-five percent of litigation from trolls against JPMorgan Chase (one
of its first larger members outside of the technology industry) were for

157. Id.
158. Jeff John Roberts, Tech and Auto Firms Join Google-Led Patent Purchase
Program, FORTUNE MAG. (May 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/patents-ip3/.
159. Ryan Davis, 4 Things to Know About Google, Ford Patent Marketplace, LAW360
(May 23, 2016, 7:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/798802/4-things-to-knowabout-google-ford-patent-marketplace.
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patents outside of the banking industry. 160 However, it is easy to see how
patents in the technology industry overlap with those in banking and
automobile manufacturing, especially with Google’s research into selfdriving cars. 161 And though the energy industry increasingly relies on new
technology from Silicon Valley to help cut costs during this slump, 162
members of the LOT network like Google and Amazon favor heavier
regulation and a push for full use of “renewable energy,” and generally
label large energy companies as the enemy. 163 On the other side, IBM,
which has been consistently filing thousands of patent assets a year, has a
large hand in energy and utility analytics 164 and is not part of LOT. 165
Though some large oil companies may be able to build a similar alliance
with smaller patent holders, the nature of the energy industry suggests it is
not likely to adopt such a model of private agreement.
Oil companies could create a group like LOT if they could agree not to
sue each other, which is unlikely. But if they could persuade IBM and other
energy-friendly technology companies to agree not to sue, they could
accrue numerous patents. That scenario is likewise implausible, as it favors
IBM with a negligible advantage to the energy companies. The technology
industry appears to view the patent system in a much more idealistic way,
with a different grasp on innovation and putting it above the competition in
some sense. The setup is essentially a patent sharing system that lets the
members steal ideas without being sued. While coding has some other
protection, like copyright, the energy industry does not have a secondary
protection for this kind of setup, except in the form of contracts. So, for the
energy industry to set up a patent infringement alliance or patent licensing
160. William New, Helping Patenters in a Sea of PAEs: Interview with LOT Network’s
Ken Seddon, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/
12/01/helping-patenters-sea-paes-interview-lot-networks-ken-seddon/.
161. See Waymo Technology, WAYMO.COM (2017), https://waymo.com/tech/ (where
Google’s self driving technology, now called Waymo, is shown to be put into cars made by
Google).
162. Rachael King, Oil and Gas Companies Turn to Digital Technology as Low Energy
Prices Pressure Business, THE WALL STREET J. (April 25, 2016, 2:13 PM), http://blogs.
wsj.com/cio/2016/04/25/oil-and-gas-companies-turn-to-digital-technology-as-low-energyprices-pressure-business/.
163. Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Back EPA in Challenge
of Clean Energy Rules, THE VERGE (April 1, 2016, 7:46 PM), http://www.theverge.com/
2016/4/1/11350482/epa-rules-backed-by-apple-google-microsoft-amazon-court-filing.
164. IBM Analytics for Transforming Energy and Utilities, IBM (2017),
http://www.ibm.com/analytics/in/en/industry/energy-and-utilities/.
165. How LOT Works, supra note 14.
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alliance similar to the LOT Network, it would require several large
companies to begin with extensive contracts that protect their most sensitive
intellectual property, while still allowing for protection against trolls. Then
the group would need to add medium and small companies, or the group
would go after all small companies as if they were trolls (or ogres). If the
larger companies treat all small companies as trolls, then the patent system
may collapse within the industry. The problem stemming from the mix of
big and small companies is that the larger companies will still provide more
patents and therefore more sway in the group. Thus, the structure of these
groups would also have to be delicately handled.
A patent lawsuit could make or break a small company. This makes them
less of a target for trolls, or at least for less money, but it also makes it less
advantageous for them to team up with an energy giant. They run the risk of
the larger companies using their patents and getting much less in return for
their agreement. Yet there is not much incentive for the members of LOT to
join, and they still have amassed numerous (600,000) patents and are
protected from being sued for infringing on any of them. 166 If there a group
of large energy patent holders formed an alliance, they would only provide
protection from the patents that have been sold to trolls by an energy
company in the alliance. Many patents (perhaps the majority) asserted by
trolls are not failed assets of an energy company that would be part of this
alliance, but ones acquired from a small company or individual that was
forced to sell for capital or a lack of manufacturing ability. So, most of the
troll’s weaponry would remain untouched without extensive membership
from smaller energy patent holders.
If the energy industry took more private action against trolls, it may be
easier to form an alliance with fewer restrictions on suing each other and
more on selling patents. However, as the many complications of the energy
industry show, private action similar to the technology industry will be
more difficult in the face of industry giants and their competitiveness
toward each other. The rise in patent suits correlating with the drop in oil
prices was due to large and medium oil companies attempting to deprive
one another of capital, not an increase in large companies attacking small
companies that had no way to pay off the damages. Without a serious
change in the landscape of the energy industry, an alliance is more trouble
than getting federal legislation passed in the first place, especially if
technology and energy lobby together for a version on which they agree.

166. Our Community, supra note 155.
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Another area in which technology companies have changed their
dealings with patent trolls is their zealous protection of their own patents
and their willingness to see a lawsuit through to court. Technology
companies have become harsher on patent asserters, which scares away
some patent trolls. But it also costs a lot to develop that reputation and
makes every single case have higher stakes. There is no quick fix for the
whole industry that will prevent extortion, nor will a successful change
prevent loss forever unless it results in changes at the individual level of the
lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants in a patent lawsuit.
C. Individual Actions To Prevent Patent Troll Extortion
Though there is advice on how to individually stop patent trolls on sites
from Huffington Post 167 to Forbes, 168 the most realistic and effective tactic
to stopping patent trolls is to understand how they work and to make sure
the company’s legal representation understands the level of risk of actual
infringement before settling and paying into the troll’s scheme. With legal
counsel that is trustworthy and aware of the chances of being targeted by a
patent troll, the costs for avoiding litigation may go up, but the costs being
paid out in unnecessary licenses will no longer directly fund the troll’s own
lawsuits. With the different demand letter laws in many states, it is
important to be up to date on each state’s specific requirements. Even
letters for infringement by one party may have to be written differently if
sent to offices in separate states. For larger businesses, the change is
generally not in how counsel understands the situation, but in a decision to
be tough on patent trolls for the sake of its other targets. With no effective
legislation, individual action is likely the most effective pathway to
stopping trolls in the immediate future. But it may be as unclear as all the
other options.
Conclusion
Patent trolls are a major problem in the United States, and they are
specifically growing within the energy industry. The fall of oil prices has

167. Bill Cheney, Measures Needed to Stop “Patent Troll” Abuse, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 5, 2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-cheney/patent-trollabuse_b_472 4533.html.
168. Drew Hendricks, 3 Measures Small Businesses Should Take to Avoid Patent Trolls,
FORBES: ENTREPRENEURS (Sept. 30, 2013, 10:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/drewhen
dricks/2013/09/30/3-measures-small-businesses-should-take-to-avoid-patent-trolls/#457430
773fb4.
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initiated an increase in patent litigation between legitimate companies and a
rise in attacks from patent trolls that is not likely to slow down without
significant intervention. Though the technology industry has several more
years of experience with these extortionists, most of the private techniques
used have been fruitless in stopping the trolls and would be improbable in
the energy industry.
Almost half of the states have provided some form of legislation in the
guise of business-friendly laws aimed at patent trolls and the evolved
shotgun approach taken with their demand letters. The state laws have
many problems, some of which are directly against the interests of most
businesses in the state, causing major difficulties in communications
between possible parties to a lawsuit. Though all the legislation is relatively
new, no regulations at the state level of a completely federal system look to
be promising, but they may have helped bring the problem to a national
audience who holds the power to demand federal legislation. Considering
the unique role of the Eastern District of Texas in the United States patent
system, the Texas law may be the only state law that has a chance of
making a dent in the large amounts of money wasted yearly on baseless
patent lawsuits and licenses.
There have been many attempts at federal legislation, but all have failed
to make it to law. Without a federal level of experimentation, an effective
law will never be found. Though the Supreme Court made changes in venue
selection law in TC Heartland and the VENUE Act may provide the same
relief, neither will effectively fix the newer shotgun approach of patent
trolls, especially for business in Texas. Federal legislation to limit prelawsuit communications such as in demand letters like most of the
aforementioned state laws may be done in a less harmful approach at the
federal level, but a study of the different effects from each state’s laws
would be needed. Even then, there would likely be an experimentation
period of several years before effective regulations could be put in place.
Though there is a large outcry for change from the government; the
technology, energy and retail industries; educators; and all sizes of
business; no federal legislation looks likely to pass soon that has not already
been covered in the Supreme Court. And the ability of patent trolls to adapt
to new legal environments may always remain faster than the federal
government.
There are many avenues for change: pleading standards, more venue
restrictions, patent suit communications, state laws, federal laws, high-court
cases, and even forming giant private alliances that promise to continue
innovation while undermining the entire patent system. But none of them
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are likely to be as effective as a company with the proper representation
that understands patent trolls’ tactics and is willing to do the work
necessary to kill the trolls. The hero that takes on the modern patent troll is
a well-informed attorney that knows how to use all the small weapons of
state laws and venue reform to protect his clients.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

